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Chapter 3 
Concerts as a Mode of Ordering in World Politics: An Ideal Type Approach 
Adam R. C. Humphreys 
 
[Note: This is the submitted, pre-copy-edited version, forthcoming in Harald Müller & Carsten Rauch 
(eds.) Great Power Multilateralism and War Prevention: Concert or Contest (Routledge, 2017).] 
 
In revisiting the 19th-century Concert1 of Europe as a potential model for global security 
governance in the 21st-century we run into a methodological challenge. We wish to explore the 
potential of a renewed concert for avoiding the continued risk of great power war today, but 
we recognise that a modern-day concert of powers would have to differ in numerous ways from 
its predecessor (Acharya 1999, 97). The problem this creates is how to define a concert in a 
way which captures those aspects of the 19th-century Concert which motivate us to re-examine 
it as a potential model, while also providing sufficient critical distance from it to recognise (and 
perhaps rectify) its faults (see Fahrmeir, this volume). 
Political scientists seeking to learn from the Concert have adopted three strategies for 
addressing this methodological challenge, none of which is wholly satisfactory. First, Jervis 
bases his definition directly on the 19th-century Concert: he argues, for example, that concerts 
“occur after, and only after, a major war fought to contain a potential hegemon” (Jervis 1985, 
60). This approach is indicative of how the Concert of Europe has framed subsequent thinking, 
but it appears to rule out the possibility of constructing a concert as an instrument for avoiding 
great power war in the contemporary world. Second, Slantchev approaches concerts through 
the lens of structural incentives, asking under what conditions a stable security order is likely 
to emerge among rational, self-interested actors (Slantchev 2005). This approach helpfully 
abstracts from the historical specificity of the Concert, but it also offers a limited sense of what 
underpinned the Concert’s success in preventing great power war: in focusing on whether states 
were satisfied with the territorial settlement, it underplays the extent to which the Concert was 
a normative achievement (Schroeder 1994; Cronin 1999, 59–66; Schulz 2007; Mitzen 2013). 
Third, Acharya contrasts concerts with other kinds of security orders (Acharya 2014). This 
helps clarify the distinctiveness of a concert order, but the underlying methodological challenge 
remains, for it is unclear how Acharya identifies the characteristics of a concert order if not by 
reference to the 19th-century Concert. 
                                                          
1 I use the lower-case ‘concert’ to refer to the concept and the upper-case ‘Concert (of Europe)’ to refer to its 
19th-century instantiation. 
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This methodological problem lies at the heart of research into concerts. The term ‘Concert 
of Europe’ has been widely used since the late 1870s to refer to the institutionalised practices 
of great power consultation and cooperation which characterised European politics after 1815 
(Holbraad 1970). Since then, the term ‘concert’ has also been used to identify various briefer 
periods in which practices of great power concertation were once again thought to be causally 
linked to increased levels of order, if not peace. These include the immediate post-war periods 
of 1919-20 and 1945-46 (Jervis 1985), the post-Locarno period (Cohrs 2003, 22–25), the period 
of détente between the US and USSR (Garrett 1976), and the early G7 (Kirton 1993). In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, Mueller (1989), Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan 
(1991), Rosecrance (1992) and Zelikow (1992) all advocated a conscious attempt to build a 
security architecture analogous to that of the European Concert. Acharya (1999; 2014) has also 
explored whether a ‘concert’ might underpin the Asian security order. In each of these cases, 
as in this volume, the term ‘concert’ is intended to capture certain characteristics of the Concert 
of Europe without suggesting that it might be reincarnated in identical form. 
The aim of this chapter is to help advance the debate about the desirability and feasibility of 
developing Concert-like norms and practices in contemporary security governance by 
conceptualising a ‘concert’ as a mode of ordering in world politics. This conceptualization is 
intended to do two things. First, it should capture what we consider to be valuable about the 
Concert of Europe as a potential model for contemporary security governance. Second, it 
should give us sufficient critical distance from the 19th-century Concert for us to consider how 
a 21st-century concert of powers would have to differ. The challenge, in short, is to articulate a 
conception of a ‘concert’ which allows us to learn from a discrete and in many ways 
idiosyncratic historical episode (the 19th-century Concert) in a fashion which respects its 
historical specificity while also extracting something of trans-historical value. 
I argue that Weber’s theorization of social science concepts as ideal types is particularly 
suited both to learning from history and, more specifically, to exploring phenomena (such as 
concerts) which are treated as social kinds despite being understood largely by reference to a 
particular historical exemplar (such as the Concert of Europe). Indeed, developing a concert 
ideal type makes three important contributions to this volume’s inquiry into the potential 
contribution of a modern-day concert to 21st-century security governance. First, it provides a 
distinctive lens through which to view the 19th-century Concert, one which focuses not just on 
the mechanics of great power consultation (see Schulz, this volume), but also on the objectives 
thereof. Second, it reveals the deep presuppositions of the idea of a concert, thereby helping to 
situate concerts theoretically. Third, it provides a conceptual basis for exploring putative 
concerts and for identifying dimensions on which real-world concerts are likely to vary. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section outlines the merits of 
an ideal type approach for addressing phenomena such as concerts and elaborates the 
characteristics of a proposed ideal-typical concert. The second section explores the historical 
specificity of the Concert of Europe when viewed through the lens of this ideal type. The third 
section situates the ideal type theoretically.  The conclusion spells out the implications of my 
analysis for a possible 21st- century concert of powers. 
3 
 
1. An Ideal-Typical Concert 
One of the most serious obstacles to learning lessons from history is the vast and conflicting 
array of precedents available.  Genuine efforts to learn from past errors may therefore be 
indistinguishable from rhetorical attempts to justify pre-determined positions by appeal to 
select examples. Given the association of the term ‘concert’ with a particular historical 
experience, seeking to learn from the 19th-century Concert about the prospects for a reimagined 
21st-century concert of powers also raises two more specific difficulties. First, we are likely to 
undertake such an endeavour only if we read at least some aspects of the Concert of Europe in 
a positive light: a return to concert principles is advocated because it is thought likely to achieve 
a desirable end. This raises the question of which comes first: our positive reading of the 
Concert (motivating our interest in applying its lessons), or a desire to promote a particular 
form of contemporary order (leading us to read the Concert in a particular light). Second, some 
aspects of the 19th-century Concert were features of their time that cannot possibly be recreated, 
while other aspects are likely to be deemed undesirable today. How, then, are we to establish 
what a ‘concert’ is, let alone explain how a refashioned 21st-century concert might reproduce 
the successes of its famous predecessor?  
These kinds of problems were familiar to Weber. Following Rickert, he contended that the 
“sheer infinity” of social life makes “exhaustive description” of even of the smallest aspect of 
it impossible (Weber 2004, 374). For this reason, he argued, “[a]ll cognitive knowledge of 
infinite reality by the finite human mind” must rest “upon the implicit presupposition that at 
any one time only a finite part of this reality … [is] ‘worth knowing’” (Weber 2004, 374). In 
other words, knowledge of social life involves giving up on the possibility of comprehensive 
description. Analysis must start by identifying which parts of social life are worth knowing. 
Knowledge of social life is therefore, by definition, “knowledge from a specific point of view”, 
that is, a point of view (or perspective) which identifies some (and only some) aspects of social 
life as worth knowing (Weber 2004, 381). As Weber famously put it: there can be “no 
‘objective’ analysis of ‘social phenomena’ independent of special and ‘one-sided’ perspectives 
on the basis of which such phenomena can be … selected as an object of research” (Weber 
2004, 374). 
The chief implication of this for the study of concerts is that the Concert of Europe is not 
“objectively inherent” in social reality (Weber 2004, 368). Rather, it is identified as an object 
of inquiry by a particular perspective brought to the study of 19th-century history. In other 
words, we pick out certain aspects of that history as constituting ‘the Concert of Europe’ 
because we approach it from a perspective which identifies those aspects as worth knowing 
(Carr 2001, 16–18). This perspective, in turn, is given shape by ‘evaluative ideas’: according 
to Weber we bring order to the sheer infinity of social life by focusing on those elements 
highlighted by “the cultural evaluative ideas that we bring to reality” (Weber 2004, 379). So 
what evaluative idea picks out concerts from the surrounding infinity of social life? I surmise 
that most researchers are motivated by an interest in the desirability of an ordering institution 
which mitigates the competitive effects of anarchy and, in particular, reduces the incidence and 
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severity of great power war. In other words, we identify the Concert of Europe as a distinctive 
phenomenon because we have a normative interest in the transformation of European politics 
after 1815 (Schroeder 1994).2  
For Weber, this question of how aspects of reality become objects of inquiry is intimately 
related to the problem of concept formation. He rejects the idea that concepts can be formed 
through “‘disinterested’ description of a concrete phenomenon, or by the abstract analysis of 
that which is common to several material phenomena” (Weber 2004, 389). This, he explains, 
is because there can be “no simple ‘descriptive reduction’ of … concepts to their elements” 
until we have determined which aspects of reality fall under the concept: we cannot compare 
instantiations of a concept until we have picked them out as objects of inquiry (Weber 2004, 
390). Weber’s point is that while instantiations of a concept may share certain features in 
common, these features are not what unites them into a class.3 What unites them into a class is 
the perspective which causes them to be picked out collectively as objects of inquiry. This 
perspective, and the evaluative idea it represents, is therefore the key to concept formation. As 
Weber explains: concepts are “formed by a one-sided accentuation of one or several 
perspectives, and through the synthesis of a variety of diffuse, discrete, individual phenomena 
… subsumed by such one-sided emphatic viewpoints so that they form a uniform construction 
in thought” (Weber 2004, 387–88). In other words, a concept gives expression to the 
perspective which picks out instantiations of that concept as a class.  
Weber’s argument implies that we cannot simply read the concept of a concert off the 
Concert of Europe or off the empirical features which the class of episodes that subsequent 
analysts have labelled as ‘concerts’ may have in common. Weber intends this argument to 
apply to all social science concepts, but it is particularly pertinent to the study of concerts, for 
there is little agreement on which periods qualify as concerts, let alone on what empirical 
characteristics they may share. Indeed, there is widespread agreement only on the status of the 
period from 1815-1848 as a concert: even the claim that the concert extended to 1914 (see 
Shulz, this volume) has been subject to considerable historiographical debate. But if this lack 
of consensus reflects the fact that periods such as 1815-48, 1848-1914, 1919-20, 1925-29, 
1945-46 and 1969-74, the G7, and the post-Cold War Asian security order are in many ways 
quite different from one another, then this need not be fatal. For according to Weber, what 
unites these episodes is precisely the evaluative perspective which, notwithstanding their 
diversity, picks them out from the sheer infinity of social life as (candidate) concerts. 
Weber describes a concept which gives expression to an evaluative perspective as an ‘ideal 
type’ (Weber 2004, 387–88). This, he explains, is because such a concept “is not a 
representation of the real, but [rather] seeks to provide representation with unambiguous means 
of expression”. Because it gives expression to an evaluative idea, it “can never be found in 
                                                          
2 This is reflected in how the term ‘Concert of Europe’ came into prominence in the mid-19th century. See 
Holbraad (1970, 3–4). Our having a normative interest does not imply that we appraise concerts positively, but 
rather that we view their effects as normatively significant. 
3 Indeed, some classes, such as the class of games, have no single (non-tautological) feature in common. See 
Wittgenstein (1972). 
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reality”: rather, “[h]istorical research has the task of determining in each individual case how 
close to, or far from, reality such an ideal type is” (Weber 2004, 387–88).4 A concert ideal type 
will therefore explicitly allow that not all concerts are identical. Indeed, it will leave 
membership of the class of concerts somewhat fuzzy (Ragin 2000), for some episodes 
identified as possible concerts will be closer to the ideal type than others. Given that one of the 
aims of this volume is to ask how a 21st-century concert of powers would have to differ from 
the Concert of Europe, this is an important strength of an ideal type approach. Instead of 
defining concerts in terms of an empirical identity (demanding that all concerts share certain 
empirical characteristics), an ideal type approach aims to facilitate inquiry into how they differ. 
Indeed, an ideal type will provide an idealised point of comparison for exploring what is 
particular to each and every concert, including the Concert of Europe. 
How, then, might we go about specifying a concert ideal type? Weber’s answer is that we 
should spell out the logic of the evaluative idea which motivates our inquiry into concerts. 
After all, it is this evaluative idea which serves to pick out the Concert of Europe as a distinct 
object of inquiry within the infinity of social life. This evaluative idea, I have suggested, is an 
interest in the desirability of an ordering institution which mitigates the competitive effects of 
anarchy and, in particular, reduces the incidence and severity of great power war. Spelling this 
out in more detail suggests seven dimensions of an ideal-typical concert. First, a concert is an 
institution, that is, a set of “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner 1982, 185). Second, a concert operates in the 
context of international anarchy. Third, a concert provides order, which we may define, 
following Bull, as a relatively stable and predictable patterning of social life among diverse 
actors which serves to sustain its principal goals (Bull 2002).5 Fourth, a concert shapes relations 
among great powers who recognise each other as such.6  A concert order is therefore not 
hegemonic.7 Fifth, war remains on the table. A concert is therefore not a security community 
(Charles Kupchan 2010, 189; Acharya 2014, 159). Sixth, for a concert to be required, great 
powers must have some competing interests, but for it to be viable, there must be some hope 
of a mutually acceptable accommodation of at least some of those competing interests. Seventh, 
because the competitive effects of anarchy are only mitigated, not dissolved, room for 
competition remains. 
I propose, therefore, that an ideal-typical concert is: 
 An ordering institution; 
                                                          
4 Thus an ideal type is a logical idealization, not a normative one. See ibid. 388. 
5 A concert provides order as distinct from providing other possible social goods such as social integration, 
equality, or justice. 
6 Schulz (this volume) emphasises that this was an innovative feature of the Vienna settlement. See also Mitzen 
(2013, 88–89). 
7 Ikenberry (2001) argues that the Concert of Europe was shaped by British hegemony, though many historians 
disagree. The implication of my ideal type is that if the post-Vienna order was structured by British hegemony 
in a fashion analogous to how the Cold War Western order was structured by US hegemony, then it was not a 
concert. See also Schulz, this volume. 
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 operating in the context of international anarchy; 
 revolving around great powers who recognise each other’s status as such;  
 which is intended to reduce the incidence and severity of war among those great 
powers; 
 by seeking to accommodate competing interests; 
 without ruling out competition among them. 
I contend that this ideal-typical conception of a concert is logically implicit in the evaluative 
idea which motivates our interest in this volume in the potential of a 21st-century concert of 
powers. I contend, moreover, that insofar as other historians and political scientists have 
identified episodes subsequent to the Concert of Europe as also being ‘concerts’, they must 
have done so with something like this ideal type implicitly in mind.8 
An ideal type is an idealization: it does not identify a set of empirical features that all concerts 
must share.  Consequently, it cannot be empirically tested. We evaluate it by asking whether it 
is useful, that is, whether it is capable of organising our thinking about concerts within what 
Weber terms “an internally coherent conceptual cosmos” (Weber 2004, 387).  One way in 
which to illustrate the potential value of my proposed ideal type is therefore to spell out its 
implications for four of the principal aspects of concerts on which previous scholarship has 
focused, viz. membership, objectives, interests, and procedures.9 
Membership. According to my ideal type,  a concert is an ordering institution operating in 
the context of international anarchy.  Its membership will therefore be formally self-selecting. 
It will consist of those states identified as great powers by their capacity to deliver ordering 
functions within a formally anarchic international system (Bull 2002). They must be at least 
two in number, because the system is not hegemonic, and they must recognise each other’s 
status as great powers and hence as legitimate members of the concert. 
Objectives. The need for a concert arises when the consequences of disorder are potentially 
so severe that great powers would rather act in concert than risk them (Mitzen 2013). 
Functionally, therefore, concerts are likely to be restricted to the security domain, wherein their 
objective is to provide order rather than any other good.10 Given this objective, a concert will 
not operate ad hominem, in the fashion of an alliance; rather, it will seek to create a set of 
common understandings, acceptable to all, about great power privileges and responsibilities. 
Interests. A concert is only required if great powers have both common and competing 
interests, the common interests including the benefit to each of an ordered international system 
which mitigates the risk of great power war and the competing interests being of sufficient 
                                                          
8 Although the differences between how historians and theorists approach the Concert is often lamented (see 
Goddard et al 2015), I suspect that both draw implicitly on ideal type thinking. 
9 See, inter alia, Garrett (1976), Jervis (1985), Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan (1991), Holsti 
(1992), Kirton (1993), Slantchev (2005), Mitzen (2013), Acharya (2014) and Schulz, this volume.  
10 I am therefore inclined to view the G7 as a club rather than a concert (see Badie, this volume). 
7 
 
magnitude to create that risk in the first place. For common understandings to be reached, great 
powers must be able to recognise the legitimacy of at least some of each other’s competing 
interests and also see the value of accommodating those interests in an ordered fashion. This 
requires, in turn, that members are able to separate and stratify their interests, being willing to 
give ground on some but not others. This accommodation is not, however, contingent on the 
development of a common identity: that would turn a concert into a security community. 
Procedures. A concert must develop consultative and decisional procedures which are 
capable of sustaining common understandings, facilitating mutual accommodation, and hence 
upholding international order. Moreover, these procedures must themselves be recognised as 
legitimate. This is likely to require (i) sufficiently frequent communication for common 
understandings to develop, (ii) the development of a common language of interests, order, 
power, and fairness, and (iii) a degree of autonomy for diplomacy and foreign policy from 
societal pressures. However, it does not make sense to specify specific procedures as part of an 
ideal-typical concert. Rather, an ideal-typical concert can encompass whatever procedures are 
capable of fulfilling these requirements. 
This conception of a concert does not, in substance, differ markedly from that proposed by 
previous theorists. Indeed, I operate on the supposition that many previous historians and 
political scientists who have explored concerts have had something like this ideal-typical 
concert in mind, even if they have not spelled it out as such. Its ideal-typical form does, 
however, offer a significant advantage. Because it abstracts from the historical particularity of 
the Concert of Europe, it provides a critical perspective from which to explore how a 21st-
century concert of powers would have to differ from its predecessor. For example, whereas 
Schulz and Mitzen both emphasise the importance of the consultation practice embodied in the 
19th-century Concert, my ideal type highlights the fact that a concert is distinguished more by 
the ends towards which such a consultation practice is directed than by the precise form it takes 
(Mitzen 2013; Schulz, this volume). The procedures of a 21st-century concert of powers may 
therefore appear quite different from those of the Concert of Europe, even though the 
underlying mode of ordering remains the same. In the remainder of this chapter, I consider 
what the proposed ideal type can reveal about the Concert of Europe and about the prospects 
for a renewed concert. 
2. The Concert of Europe in Ideal Type Perspective 
As noted, a concert ideal type does not specify a particular institutional form, but rather 
expresses the logic of ordering to which a concert approximates. Examining the Concert of 
Europe through the lens of the proposed ideal type therefore helps to reveal how closely its 
particular institutional features reflected its contingent historical circumstances. The key factor 
shaping its particular institutional form is that it originated in the determination of the great 
powers allied against Napoleon after 1812 to reach the common understandings and 
agreements required to sustain the coalition until total victory was achieved and thence to build 
a sustainable peace settlement (Schroeder 1986, 12; Charles Kupchan 2010, 190; Mitzen 2013, 
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85–88).11 The ensuing interests, practices, and norms carried over first into the Congress 
system and thence to the post-1822 concert. These circumstances account for many of the ways 
in which, as we shall see, the 19th-century Concert departs from the provisions of the concert 
ideal type. Yet this departure is a strength, not a weakness, of the ideal type approach, for it 
helps us to resist inferring too much about concerts in general from idiosyncratic features of 
the 19th-century Concert. 
Membership. Membership of the Concert of Europe was self-selecting (Holsti 1992, 35–
36), but informal hierarchies shaped its operation in important ways. For example, Schroeder 
argues that Russian and British hegemony was a key feature of the Vienna settlement: far from 
being ordered by a group of equal great powers, it was a “pentarchy composed of two 
superpowers [Russia and Britain], one authentic but vulnerable great power [France], one 
highly marginal and even more vulnerable great power [Austria], and one power called great 
by courtesy only [Prussia]” (Schroeder 1992, 688). Moreover, these great powers were imperial 
states, though of differing kinds: Austria was an imperial European state, Russia was an 
imperial European and Asian state, Britain ruled a colonial empire, and France also ruled a 
colonial empire (though it was substantially rebuilt only from the 1830s onwards), while 
Prussia, though ruling a small German empire, only acquired significant overseas colonies as 
part of a united Germany in the 1880s. These features of Concert membership illustrate the 
extent to which any concert is likely to be characterised by historical particularity and 
contingency. They suggest that no direct inference should be drawn from the Concert of Europe 
about the required number of great powers for a concert to operate, about the kinds of states 
involved (including precisely where the line is drawn between great powers and the rest), or 
about the nature of the informal hierarchies that may or may not operate within a concert order.  
Objectives. The Concert of Europe emerged when the risk of further great power war was 
widely believed to be so damaging that the great powers would rather act in concert. Although 
its origins lay in an alliance against France, it quickly lost this ad hominem quality. 
Functionally, it operated in the security domain and within that domain it provided order, in 
contrast to the more ideological agenda pursued by the Holy Alliance. These features of the 
Concert were all reflected in the commitment of the Quadruple (and later Quintuple) Alliance 
to maintaining the provisions of the Vienna treaty order and to employing great power 
conferences to resolve future threats to a stable international order (Lauren 1983, 35–36). 
However, the construction of particular issues, such as the Eastern question, as security 
problems was very much a feature of its time, reflecting both the imperial basis of the 19th-
century system and also the extent to which the very concept of security was, at that time, 
detachable from other goods such as self-determination and human rights. It is not obvious that 
a similar separation is either feasible or desirable today. I contend, therefore, that how the 
security domain is demarcated should be treated as specific to each putative concert. 
                                                          
11 Of course, disagreements among the great powers continued, emerging especially at Vienna. See Schroeder 
(1986, p. 19), Schroeder (1992, pp. 696–7), Slantchev (2005, pp. 575–6). The point of a concert is that (at least 
some) competing interests are accommodated, not that they wholly disappear. 
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Interests. The Concert of Europe exhibited a wide and fluctuating range of common and 
competing interests. Indeed, the development of the concert system after 1822 reflected both 
the ideological split between liberal and conservative powers and also the fact that this split did 
not trump their common interest in maintaining a stable security order (Rosecrance 1963). The 
extent to which great powers were willing to recognise the legitimacy of (at least some of) each 
other’s competing interests was reflected in their acceptance of local spheres of influence and 
in the volume of diplomatic correspondence dedicated to clarifying issue hierarchies prior to 
concert summits (Lauren 1983, 43–46). Similarly, the separation and stratification of interests 
required to ensure that accommodation could be achieved in one domain while leaving others 
untouched is exemplified in what Schroeder terms “the ‘fencing off’ of the European state 
system from the extra-European world”, that is, the separation of the management of European 
conflicts of interest from maritime and colonial conflicts (Schroeder 1986, 12). However, the 
specific ways in which competing interests were accommodated, such as the creation of 
“intermediary bodies”, is a contingent feature of the Concert from which no clear inference 
may be derived about the kinds of measures likely to be successful in accommodating 
competing great power interests today (Schroeder 1986, 17). 
One of the most striking features of the Concert of Europe is that it seemed to involve more 
than the mere accommodation of interests. Schroeder argues that statesmen sought to produce 
a “political equilibrium”, reflecting a “mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law, 
and an overall balance among the various actors in terms of rights, security, status, claims, 
duties, and satisfactions” (Schroeder 1992, 694). Although this has been contested (Kraehe 
1992, 712), Mitzen has once again argued that the Concert embodied a kind of collective 
agency which went beyond merely self-interested cooperation (Mitzen 2013, 7). Hence while 
the Concert illustrates the basic dynamic of common and competing interests required for 
concert ordering to take root, the specificity and contingency of the particular interests in play 
is such that few direct inferences can be drawn from the 19th-century Concert about the specific 
configuration of interests that might underpin any future concert. 
Procedures. The various means by which the Concert sought to accommodate competing 
interests constitute some of its most recognizable features. For example, the 1815 Vienna 
Treaty provisions on diplomatic immunity find their modern counterpart in the 1961 Vienna 
Diplomatic Convention, while the use of summit meetings in the G7/8 displays obvious 
parallels with Concert practices (Kirton 1993). Yet my ideal type stipulates nothing about the 
form that consultation must take, beyond the fact that members must consult to whatever extent 
and in whatever form required to reach common understandings. It is worth noting, in this 
regard, that the form of Concert diplomacy changed after 1822, with summits and ambassador 
conferences thenceforth occurring on a more ad hoc basis (Holsti 1992, 38–39). Recent 
research suggests that these meetings of the Concert were responsible for making more, and 
also more substantive, decisions than has previously been recognised (Schulz, this volume), 
while Mitzen argues that the Concert’s consultation forums were essential to its success 
(Mitzen 2013, 62). But none of this shows that different procedures might not have produced 
a similar result and nor does it imply, therefore, that specific procedures associated with the 
19th-century Concert should automatically carry over to any other concert. The key point, as 
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emphasised by the ideal type, is that the consultative and decisional procedures must be 
adequate to develop and sustain common understandings and facilitate mutual accommodation. 
This brief analysis suggests that some scholars have been too uncritical in treating the 
Concert of Europe as a model for all subsequent and future concerts. For example, Miller fails 
to abstract sufficiently from historically contingent features of the 19th-century Concert in 
arguing that all great powers have to share a fear of revolution or inadvertent war for a concert 
to be formed (Miller 1994, 328). It is a strength of the ideal type approach that it brings out the 
historical particularity and contingency of the Concert of Europe. Yet it thereby also brings out 
the difficulties involved in deriving inferences from historical cases about what will work in 
different circumstances. Of course, the very flexibility of the ideal type reveals that a variety 
of institutional provisions might be capable of sustaining a similar kind of order. This may raise 
hope that some of the Concert’s successes might be replicated, but it also reinforces the fact 
that the 19th-century Concert offers little clear guidance regarding the institutional structures 
most likely to achieve this goal. Indeed, the proposed ideal type emphasises that the heart of 
the Concert was less its specific institutional form than its norms of consultation and 
accommodation (Schulz 2007). 
3. Situating Concerts as a Mode of Ordering 
Before going on to ask what our ideal type implies about the prospects for a 21st-century 
concert, it will be helpful to situate concerts as a mode of ordering by examining the 
presuppositions that are built into the concert ideal type. The evaluative idea which underpins 
the ideal type is an interest in the desirability of an ordering institution which mitigates the 
competitive effects of anarchy and, in particular, reduces the incidence and severity of great 
power war. But we are likely to hold such an interest only if we also subscribe to three further 
beliefs. The first is empirical: the international system is anarchic, though its risks can be 
mitigated. The second is methodological: states may usefully be treated as atomistic individuals 
who create social norms through their interactions. The third is ethical: by upholding a rule-
governed pluralism, concerts produce a potentially valuable end. I explore each of these further 
below and show that, as embodied in my ideal type, concerts dovetail with softer, ethically-
oriented forms of realism and with thinner forms of constructivism. As such, concerts are 
neither a form of balance of power politics nor a progressive project, but rather occupy a space 
in between.12 
An ideal type which can encompass both the Concert of Europe and a putative 21st-century 
concert can help us think about how the latter might differ from the former only on the 
assumption that (formal) anarchy has remained a reasonably stable feature of the international 
landscape over the last two hundred years. To associate concerts with anarchy is not, however, 
to associate them with a logic of anarchy in the neorealist sense (Mearsheimer 2001): the point 
is not that anything determinate follows from anarchy for state behaviour, but that anarchy 
                                                          
12 Mitzen (2013, pp. 21-7) makes a similar argument specifically about the Concert of Europe. 
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provides the context in which conflicts of interest must be negotiated. The role of anarchy in 
the proposed concert ideal type is more akin to its place in Wendt’s constructivism (Wendt 
1999): anarchy distinguishes the international from other social realms, but it is consistent with 
multiple sets of more or less stable social conventions. In other words, anarchy is a context 
which can be navigated in more or less ordered ways. The implication of the concert ideal type 
is that concerts represent a conceptually coherent means of negotiating conflicts of interest 
under anarchy. It remains a further question whether, in any particular context, the required 
conditions for a concert to operate, such as the willingness of great powers to recognise the 
legitimacy of each other’s competing interests, will be fulfilled. 
My concert ideal type treats states as coming to the negotiating table with reasonably well 
defined interests and a reasonably well ordered issue hierarchy which allows them to 
distinguish between their essential and negotiable interests and to determine which competing 
interests are legitimate. In other words, the ideal type embodies a form of methodological 
individualism. It allows that states may develop practices which acquire normative weight, that 
this normative weight may in turn help to reproduce those practices, and hence that these norms 
and practices may play a causal role in maintaining order (Schulz 2007, 48). However, the ideal 
type does not allow that states’ interests are defined by their role in the broader social system 
in the way, say, that an individual’s role as a capital owner might constitute her interests within 
a capitalist system. This individualism is built into the evaluative idea I have identified as 
driving research into concerts, but it also imposes some analytical limitations. From a 
methodologically individualist perspective, for example, appeals within the Concert of Europe 
to a greater European unity appear as rhetorical attempts to represent individual interests as 
being in the common interest.13 Absent from this perspective is any space for the idea of a 
greater Europe to play any more than an instrumental role: any space, that is, for the idea that 
European states were already bound together by, for example, historical commonality, dynastic 
ties, or a shared culture, and that this might give direction to their individual interests (Jackson 
2004).14 
In many cases, scholars with an interest in the desirability of an ordering institution which 
mitigates the competitive effects of anarchy will also believe that the positives associated with 
ordering institutions such as concerts outweigh the negatives. This is a non-agonistic belief, in 
the sense that it implies that competing interests can potentially be accommodated to the benefit 
of all, and it is consistent with, but does not entail, the stronger view that states with the capacity 
to do so also therefore have a duty to provide ordering functions on behalf of the broader 
international community. To the extent that research into concerts is motivated by such a belief, 
that belief requires justification.15 Two broad kinds of justification are possible. One is that 
                                                          
13 In Mitzen’s (2013, 53–54) more nuanced formulation, such appeals may represent public, as distinct from 
private, reason, but this public reason still constrains rather than constitutes individual action. 
14 Mitzen (2013, 26–27) explicitly criticises Cronin (1999, 47–52) for viewing the idea of a greater Europe in 
this way.  
15 We cannot automatically assume that research into concerts is motivated by such a belief. We might, for 
example, be interested in concerts not because we hold such a belief, but rather because we are interested in 
what institutional structures have been developed or advocated by actors who do hold such a belief. 
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pluralism itself is valuable and that a concert is a feasible and relatively costless means of 
preserving pluralism. The implication of this position is that what is good for states is also in 
some measure good for their citizens. The second justification is that a rule-governed pluralism 
is sufficiently good for now, whether because there is no feasible route to more desirable 
alternatives, because the costs of the transition would outweigh the benefits, or because the 
best means of achieving transformation is through a reformist process which requires 
preserving pluralism for now. 
Recognizing these presuppositions of the concert ideal type suggests, on the one hand, that 
concerts should be distinguished from the kind of balance of power politics associated 
historically with 18th-century great power politics and theoretically with neorealism but, on the 
other hand, that concerts are at most reformist, rather than progressive, institutions.16 In this 
sense, concert thinking fits comfortably with Bull’s contingent defence of pluralism and with 
Morgenthau’s consideration of the potential benefits and risks of seeking to transcend anarchy 
in pursuit of peace (Bull 2002; Morgenthau 1973). Theoretically speaking, therefore, research 
into concerts as a mode of ordering is best understood as being located at the intersection of 
more contingent and ethically grounded forms of realism (Williams 2005) with thinner forms 
of constructivism which focus on the processual nature of social life without necessarily 
endorsing arguments for social change. 
4. Conclusion: Prospects for a Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers 
Many of the most well-known features of the Concert of Europe were historically contingent 
and hence could not be precisely replicated even if they were thought desirable. Indeed, it is 
difficult to infer anything directly from its successes and failures about the prospects for a 21st-
century concert. The Concert of Europe does, nonetheless, demonstrate the contingent 
feasibility of an ordering institution of the kind imagined in our ideal type. There are, moreover, 
two further ways in which an ideal type approach can inform our thinking about the prospects 
for a 21st-century concert. First, recalling that an ideal type is an idealization which no actual 
concert can match precisely, we can ask on which dimensions concerts are likely to vary and 
which variations might be more likely to sustain a concert. Second, we can ask to what extent 
the deep presuppositions of the ideal type (outlined above) hold true in today’s international 
system. 
Because an ideal type does not specify empirical conditions that a putative concert must 
fulfill, but rather offers an idealised point of comparison, it also serves to illustrate the 
dimensions on which concerts could, in principle, vary. Thus in terms of membership concerts 
might vary in the number and nature of the members (are they all states?), in the willingness 
with which great powers recognise each other’s status, and in the extent to which the informal 
hierarchy institutionalised in a concert is accepted by other states, that is, in the extent to which 
other states regard an identified set of great powers as possessing special rights and 
                                                          
16 Schroeder’s (1994) claim about the transformation of European politics is, in this sense, a bounded one.  
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responsibilities (Bull 2002). In terms of their objectives, concerts might vary in how clearly 
and tightly the security domain is defined, in whether they are restricted to that domain, in 
whether they solely provide order or also seek to provide other goods, and in whether they 
compete with other ordering institutions. In terms of the interests at stake, there may be 
variation in the extent to which great powers are willing and able to separate and stratify their 
interests and to recognise the legitimacy of others’ competing interests. There may also be 
variation in whether accommodating competing interests means altering the status quo and, if 
so, to what extent. Finally, there may be variation in the degree of formality and 
institutionalization, in the degree to which leaders are insulated from popular pressure, and in 
the extent to which concerts are deliberative or decisional (Kirton 1993, 352). 
In some of these dimensions, it seems intuitively obvious which kinds of variation are likely 
to favour a concert’s success. In other dimensions, it is less clear. Thus, for example, common 
sense suggests that a concert stands a greater chance of success when there is greater internal 
and external acceptance of the legitimacy of its membership (see Jüngling and Mallavarapu, 
this volume), when it operates in a domain in which the great powers are the key players and 
in which there is little competition from other bodies, when the risk of great power war is 
widely feared, when a common value is placed on prudence, moderation, and restraint, and 
when concert procedures foster personal trust among leaders. On the other hand, it is less 
obvious what the impact might be of variation in the number of members, in the nature of those 
members (for example, if non-state actors such as the EU were included as members), in the 
substantive domain in which concerts operate, in the extent of economic interdependence 
among members, in whether a concert seeks to uphold or reform the status quo, in the degree 
of popular pressure to which leaders are subject, in the degree of formality and 
institutionalization, or in the extent to which the focus is decisional or consultative. The ideal 
type helpfully identifies these issues and locates them within the broader logic underpinning 
our interest in concerts, but it cannot, on its own, provide a recipe for success. 
It is also instructive to juxtapose the underlying presuppositions of the concert ideal type 
with key features of the contemporary international system. For example, it is a very real 
question whether anarchy endures in the sense required for concert thinking to gain traction. 
The rise of international institutions as a locus of global governance and the associated 
legalization of world politics have introduced new elements of hierarchy into world politics 
(Gruber 2000; Goldstein et al. 2001), while the Responsibility to Protect has formalised the 
idea that sovereignty is conditional rather than absolute. Even if the risks of great power war 
endure, a case still needs to be made that these risks are best mitigated through a concert. 
Similar doubts might be raised about whether states can usefully be treated as atomistic actors 
in a world order characterised by the dominance of capitalist structures and by the 
fragmentation of governing authority (Wallerstein 1979; Slaughter 2004). Finally, we can ask 
to what extent these developments undermine the validity and feasibility of a pluralist ethic 
(Hurrell 2007). Although I do not offer substantive answers to these questions, many of which 
are explored in other chapters in this volume, it seems reasonable to surmise that as 
assumptions about the endurance of anarchy, the utility of methodologically individualist 
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analysis, and the value of pluralism come under strain, so too will the concert model become 
less relevant. 
These questions illustrate that when it comes to studying concerts, and a fortiori when it 
comes to thinking about the prospects for a 21st-century concert as an instrument of security 
governance, an ideal type approach cannot provide all the answers. Yet any attempt to consider 
which institutional provisions would be most appropriate for such a concert must surely 
proceed with at least an implicit ideal-typical conception of a concert in mind. For in even 
asking what form a 21st-century concert of powers would have to take, and whether it could 
work, we implicitly recognise that concerts can take a variety of forms and that the 19th-century 
Concert was only one such possible form. To this extent, the merits of an ideal type approach 
to research into concerts should be obvious: it provides a conception of a concert which 
abstracts from the particularity of the Concert of Europe, but without denying its historical 
specificity.  It thereby starts us on the road to learning from history. 
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